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PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS: TAX CONSIDERATIONS OF
INCORPORATING A LAW FIRM
I. Introduction
One of the foremost questions now being asked by attorneys is whether or
not they should incorporate their law practices. The purpose of this note is not
to answer this question, but rather to delineate for any such attorney the advan-
tages and the disadvantages of incorporation so that he may make an intelligent
decision on his own behalf.
This note is divided into sections discussing historical development, advan-
tages and disadvantages of professional incorporation, and potential tax prob-
lems arising from professional incorporation. The first briefly traces the legis-
lative history and case authority from which the Internal Revenue Code's present
tax treatment of incorporated law firms has been derived and discusses the legis-
lative changes now being considered by Congress. The second section schemat-
ically sets forth the tax and nontax considerations that must be examined before
an attorney can make an informed decision on whether to incorporate. The
third discusses the major tax problems law firms will encounter in changing to
the corporate form.
II. Historical Development
For many years a dispute existed between professionals and the Internal
Revenue Service as to whether professional organizations could qualify as cor-
porations under the federal tax laws.' Although state law traditionally prohibited
professionals from incorporating,' doctors and lawyers contended that any profes-
sional practice organized as an unincorporated association was entitled to cor-
porate tax treatment, since associations are treated as corporations under the
Code.' The Internal Revenue Service, on the other hand, maintained that any
business barred by state law from operating in the corporate form could not file
as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.
This dispute reached litigation for the first time in the celebrated case of
United States v. Kintner.4 Kintner was a physician, licensed and practicing in
the state of Montana. For many years prior to 1948, he had been a member of
a partnership practicing medicine under the firm name of Western Montana
1 See generally Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Cor-
porations, 49 MNN. L. REv. 603 (1965); Bittker, Professional Service Organizations: A
Reply, 24 TAx L. Rav. 300 (1969); Thies, An Estate Planner's Approach to the Professional
Corporation, 109 TRuSTS & ESTATES, 83 (1970); Mullane & Williams, Professional Organ-
izations-Genera Coverage, 227 TAx MANAGEMENT PORTFOLio A-1 (1970); Cindrich, Taxa-
tion of Professional Service Organizations: Morrissey to Empey, 13 TAx CoUN. Q. 27 (1969).
2 "Traditionally, state law barred professionals from practicing in the corporate form
because of the fear that limited liability would lead to a deterioration in the quality of their
services." Note, Professional Corporations: Analysis Under the Tax Reform Act and Survey
of State Statutes, 58 GEo. L.j. 487, 488 (1970).
3 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (3) states: "The term 'corporation' includes as-
sociations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies."
4 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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Clinic. In 1948 the partnership was dissolved, and the former partners executed
"Articles of Association" under which they intended to run their clinical prac-
tice. These articles stated that the association was formed " 'for the practice of
medicine and surgery as an unincorporated association,' which was to be endowed
with the 'attributes of a corporation' and to be 'treated as a corporation for
the purposes of taxation.' "' At the end of the association's first taxable year,
the Internal Revenue Service rejected its attempt to file a corporate tax return,
maintaining that the association was a partnership and that Dr. Kintner and the
other physicians must report all of Western's income on their individual tax re-
turns. On appeal, the court ruled that although Montana law barred the prac-
tice of medicine in corporate form, the organization possessed the corporate
characteristics of associates, business purposes, continuity of life and partial limi-
tation of liability so as to qualify as a corporation under the Morrissey "resem-
blance" test.' In reaching its decision, the court declared that state law had no
bearing on the question of whether the organization was entitled to corporate
tax treatment:
[Ilt would introduce an archaic element into federal taxation if we deter-
mined the nature of associations by State criteria rather than by special
criteria sanctioned by the tax law. . . . It would destroy the uniformity
so essential to a federal tax system-a uniformity which calls for equal
treatment of taxpayers, no matter in what State their activities are carried
on .7
Refusing to acquiesce to the court's holding in Kintner, the Service again
challenged a professional organization's right to file a corporate tax return in
Galt v. United States.8 In Galt a group of physicians operated a clinic as an un-
incorporated association in order to gain the federal tax advantages available to
corporations. The Service refused to treat the organization as a corporation,
arguing that to do so would contradict Texas law which prohibited physicians
from incorporating their practices. As in Kintner, the court ruled that although
Texas prohibited professional corporations, this had no effect on the association's
status for federal income tax purposes; the court further stated that the only
applicable criteria was whether the association met the Morrissey-Kintner "re-
semblance" test. Applying this test, the Galt court found that the clinic was
entitled to be taxed as a corporation.
Dissatisfied with the holdings in Kintner and Galt, the Government an-
nounced that it would not follow these decisions, and in 1960 the Treasury De-
partment issued new regulations opposing the further formation of professional
associations.9 Although these regulations adopted the characteristics laid down in
5 Id. at 420.
6 The "resemblance doctrine" originated in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344
(1935). In Morrissey, the Supreme Court held that in order to be treated as an "association"
taxable as a corporation, a business organization must possess five characteristics: (1) Cen-
tralization of management, (2) continuity of life, (3) transferability of interest, (4) limited
personal liability, and (5) legal title to property in the organization.
7 216 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1954).
8 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
9 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to .7701-4, 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to .7701-4 (1961).
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Kintner as the federal standard for judging whether an organization should be
taxed as a corporation, they further declared that state law would determine
whether these characteristics existed in any particular organization."0 For any
professional association operating in a state which barred professional corpora-
tions," the immediate effect of the 1960 regulations was to make it virtually im-
possible for such associations to qualify for corporate tax treatment. 2
Although these regulations ran contrary to the court holdings in Kintner
and Gait, few professionals found it necessary to challenge their validity. 3
Reacting to the 1960 regulations, professional organizations, such as state bar
associations, induced state legislatures to enact statutes permitting professionals
to form "corporations" or "associations" which qualified under the 1960 regula-
tions as corporations.' 4 In response to the enactment of a number of such statutes,
the Government in 1965 amended its regulations by the addition of two new
sections.' The first declared that although organizations may be organized under
professional corporation statutes, these statutes "are in and of themselves of no
10 Id.
11 In 1960 all states prohibited attorneys from incorporating their practices.
12 See Mullane & Williams, supra note 1, at A-16. See Note, Professional Associations
and Corporations: Tax Considerations, 11 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 685, 687 (1970).
13 However, the 1960 regulations were challenged in Foreman v. United States, 232
F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964). In this case, the court, although not expressly ruling the
1960 regulations invalid, held that local law had no effect on whether a professional organiza-
tion would qualify for corporate tax treatment under the Code. In explaining its reasoning
the district court said:
[Ilt would introduce an archaic element into federal taxation if we determined the
nature of associations by state criteria. . . . It would destroy the uniformity so
essential to a federal tax system. Id. at 136.
14 B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders
2-15 (3rd ed. 1971). Presently all fifty states and the District of Columbia have professional
corporation or professional association statutes. The following statutes appearing in roman
type allow attorneys to incorporate, those preceded by an asterisk authorize attorneys to form
professional associations. *ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 330-45 (Supp. 1971); ALASK.A STAT. §§
10.45.010-.260 (1968); ARiz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-901 to -909 '(Supp. 1972); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 64-2001 to 2018 (Supp. 1971); CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6160-72 (West Supp.
1972); COLO. Rzv. STAT. ch. 23, rule 265 (1963); *CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-84 (1969);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 601-20 (Supp. 1970); D.C. Pun. L. No. 92-180, (Dec. 10, 1971)
(D.C. Code Legislative & Administrative Service Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 621.01-.15
(Supp. 1972); - GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-4301-4318 (1967); HAwAII REv. LAWS §§ 416-141-154
(Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-1301-1314 (1967); *ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§
415-1-17 (1970); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-5101-5111 (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 4960
(Supp. 1972); KAN. STA r. ANN. §§ 17-2706-2719 (Supp. 1971); Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§
274.005-.990 (1969); LA. REv. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 801-15 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, §§ 701-16 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, f§ 430-44 '(Supp. 1971); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156A, §§ 1-17 (Supp. 1971); Micr. Comp. LAwS ANN. §§ 450.221-.235
(1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 319.26-.41 (1969); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 5390-41-57 (Supp.
1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 356.010-.200 (1966); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 15-2101-
2116 (1967); NEB. RIv. STAT. § 21-2201-2222 "(1970); *N.H. REv. STAT. §§ 89.010-.110
(1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:l-A:8 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-22-1-14
(Supp. 1971); N.Y. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.01-.06 (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55B-1-15
(Supp. 1971); 'OHO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1785.01-.08 (Supp. 1971); OLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 801-19 (Supp. 1972); OREGON PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT, ch. 592, [1969]
OREGON LAWS 1222; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2901-14 (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 7-5.1-1-12 (1970); *S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-1601-1617 (Supp. 1971); S.D. ComP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 47-13A-1-10 (Supp. 1972); *TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2001-07 (Supp. 1972);
TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528e, §§ 1-20 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-1-15
(Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 901-13 '(Supp. 1972); *VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-
542-556 (Supp. 1971); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 18.100-18.100.140 (Supp. 1971); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 30-2-5a (Supp. 1972); Wis STAT. ANN. §§ 180.99(1)-(11) (Supp. 1972); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 17-49.1 (Supp. 1971).
15 Treas. Regs. §§ 301.7701-1 .7701-2 (1965).
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importance in the classification of such organizations for the purpose of taxation
under the Internal Revenue Code."' 6 The second stated that professional organ-
izations would be deprived of corporate tax status unless a majority of their
business and legal characteristics closely resembled those of a typical business
corporation." The two new sections were followed by numerous examples which
demonstrated how difficult it would be for a professional organization to meet
the requirements laid down in the regulations. In short, the amendments made
it impossible for a professional organization to qualify for corporate tax treatment.
The validity of the 1965 amendments was challenged for the first time in
United States v. Empey." In this case the plaintiff, an attorney, was an employee-
shareholder in a four-man law firm incorporated under Colorado law. 9 In his
federal tax return for 1965, the taxpayer reported not only his salary for the year
but also ten per cent of the net income of the corporation, despite the fact that
none of the corporation's income had been distributed to him. Realizing that
he had overstated his income for the year, he filed a timely claim for a refund of
the excess tax paid by him. The Service rejected the petitioner's claim, ruling
that the corporation was a partnership for federal purposes, and therefore that
the plaintiff had properly reported his income. The matter went to trial and on
appeal the court of appeals sustained the district court's ruling that the plaintiff
was entitled to a refund. In reaching its decision, the court ruled that the revenue
regulations of 1965 were invalid and declared that the Code required the
Treasury Department to treat as a corporation any entity chartered and operated
in good faith as a corporation under state law.
Despite the adverse decision in Empey, the Service continued to maintain
that no professional association or corporation could qualify under the 1965
regulations as a corporation. Subsequent to Empey, the Treasury suffered 17
consecutive court defeats on this issue." The majority of these cases followed the
Empey rationale: the 1965 regulations were invalid and that any professional
association or corporation so labeled by state law automatically qualified as a
corporation for federal tax purposes.
As a result of these defeats, the Service announced on August 8, 1969, that
it was conceding the issue and that organizations complying with state professional
association acts would be treated as a corporation for tax purposes.2' Thus it
now appears that the Treasury will recognize corporate status for any professional
organization chartered and operated under state professional association or
corporation acts.'
In 1969 a proposal was made in Congress to deny corporate tax advantages
to professional corporations. The impetus for legislative action apparently arose
16 Id. § 301.7701-1(c).
17 Id. § 301.7701-2.
18 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
19 COLO. Rv. STAT. ch. 23, rule 265 (1963).
20 See, e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969); Kurzner v. United
States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969); Wallace v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.
Ark. 1968); Holder v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
21 T.I.R. No. 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969), reported in, J. Vassen, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS §
13.18 '(1970).
22 But cf. Jerome J. Roubik, 53 T.C. 365 (1969).
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from a front-page article in the New York Times which severely criticized the
tax benefits available to professionals who elect to incorporate their practices.2"
The article resulted in much debate in Congress and prompted the Senate
Finance Committee to propose that HR 13270 be written into the Tax Reform
Act of 1969.24 As written, HR 13270 would have eliminated most of the tax
advantages now available to professional corporations. But on December 9, 1969,
the Senate overwhelmingly voted to delete the proposal from the 1969 Tax Re-
form Bill which was later adopted by Congress.2"
Presently, there is some doubt as to whether Congress will continue to allow
professionals practicing under a corporate charter to receive tax treatment more
advantageous than that given to professionals practicing as sole proprietors or in
partnership form. Despite its acquiescence, the Treasury Department is presently
studying the effects of the tax benefits now being enjoyed by professional corpora-
tions and searching for means of closing these loopholes.26 Futhermore, Congress-
man Wilbur Mills has introduced into Congress the Tax Policy Act of 1972
[H.R. 15230].27 This bill, if enacted into law, will severely curtail the preferential
treatment now afforded the professional corporations.2"
Although it is impossible to foresee what action the Congress will take, should
it adopt Congressman Mills' proposal, there would appear to be little reason for
attorneys to incorporate their practice.
23 Thies, An Estate Planner's Approach to the Professional Corporation, 109 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 83, 152-53 (1970).
24 Id.
25 However, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 did adversely affect the tax treatment of cor-
porate law firms in two ways. First, the Act reduced the tax benefits derived from employee
pension and profit-sharing plans by partially eliminating capital gain treatment for lump sum
distribution. See INT. RV. CODE of 1954, §§ 402(a), 403(a) and 72(n). Second, the
1969 legislation terminated many of the advantages previously available to firms who elected
to become Subchapter S Corporations. INT. RV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 1371-78. A Sub-
chapter S Corporation is taxed like a partnership, but its shareholders retain the status of
employees. This gave a Subchapter S Corporation a tremendous advantage over the partner-
ship or regular corporate form of doing business. By being taxed as a partnership, the Sub-
chapter S Corporation avoided many of the disadvantages of corporate form, e.g., double
taxation, accumulated earnings tax, personal holding company tax and unreasonable compen-
sation problems. See, text part IV infra. Although taxed like a partnership, the Subchapter
S Corporation possessed the corporate attributes of limited liability and continuity of existence,
and its attorneys-shareholders held the status of employees. Thus, prior to 1969, an attorney-
shareholder, unlike a partner, was entitled to participate in corporate pension and profit-shar-
ing plans, tax-free sick pay, group term life insurance, tax-free medical expense plans, and
$5,000 tax-free death benefits. See, text part III infra. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, by
adding § 1379 to the Code, imposed severe limitations upon the retirement plans of such cor-
porations. Specifically, the Act requires any attorney-shareholder of a Subchapter S Corpora-
tion to report as income any contributions made by the firm on his behalf to the extent that
the contributions exceed the lesser of 10% of his compensation or $2,500.
Since the restrictions of § 1379 do not apply to regular corporations, attorneys deciding
to incorporate their practices will find it to their advantage not to make a Subchapter S elec-
tion. See Greenburg, Special Problems of the Professional Association, 12th TUL. TAx INST.
82, 98-99 (1971); Note, Incorporating the Professional Practice: Federal Tax Aspects, 38
BROOKcLYN L. Rxv. 449, 472 (1971); J. Vassen, supra note 21, at § 2.32.
26 See Washington Post, Oct. 26, 1969, § A, at 3, col. 8.
27 P-H PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING If 2.16 (1972).
28 H.R. 15230 calls for the termination of the following tax advantages:
'(1) Capital gain treatment of lump sum distribution from pension funds;
(2) Exclusion from gross income of sick pay;
(3) Retirement income credit;
(4) Qualified stock options;
(5) $5,000 death benefit exclusion;
(6) Exclusion from gross income of group term life insurance of employees.
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III. Advantages of Incorporation
Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans.29 It is to the advantage of any attorney
to defer until retirement the taxation of income acquired during peak earning
years. 0 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, permits attorneys to
establish retirement plans which achieve this result. For an attorney who is part
or sole owner of a law practice, there are two methods of adopting a retirement
plan. First, if the attorney's firm is a sole proprietorship or a partnership, he may
utilize the Self-Employed Individuals Retirement Act of 1962 [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Keogh Plan]." Second, if the law firm is organized as a profes-
sional corporation or a professional association under state law, the attorney can
use §§ 401-404 of the Code [hereinafter referred to as the Corporate Plan]. 2
Under both the Keogh and the Corporate Plans the deferral of income is ac-
complished by the contribution by the firm to the fund, on the attorney's behalf,
a set percentage of the attorney's income. This contribution is deductible by the
law firm as a business expense, and is excludable from the attorney's gross income
until the benefits are actually received.3 Furthermore, the income generated and
accumulated by the fund is exempt from taxation.3
However, there are considerable differences between the Keogh and Corpo-
rate Plans. The most significant is that under the Keogh Plan only the lesser of
10 per cent of an attorney's salary or $2,500 may be placed tax free into the fund
each year.3 Under the Corporate Plan an attorney may annually have up to
29 See generally, Goldstein, Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans: Fallacies and Facts, 38
TAxEs 71 (1960); Harl, Selected Aspects of Employee Status in Small Corporations, 13 KANs.
L. REv. 23 (1964); Snyder & Weckstein, Quasi-corporations, Quasi-employees and Quasi-tax
Relief for Professional Persons, 48 CORN. L. Q. 613 (1963); J. Vassen, supra note 21, at § 9.
30 A single example demonstrates the dramatic savings gained by adopting a retirement
plan. Assume that Attorney B is earning $50,000 taxable income from his practice. Based
upon the billed earnings of his partnership, B presently earns an additional $7,500. Having
earned an additional $7,500 in a $50,000 tax bracket, B would net approximately 50 per cent
after tax-s or $3,750. Assuming B invests this $3,750 at 5 per cent, he is going to be earning
only 2.5 per cent net after taxes. Thus, if B invests the additional $3,750 for each of 25
years, he will build up a retirement fund of approximately $130,000 after taxes.
If, however, B were to set up a qualified retirement plan in accordance with §§ 401-404
of the Code, and if he contributed the same $7,500 per year into the plan, the following
would result. The firm's income would remain unchanged since the firm is allowed a deduction
for its contribution to the plan just as if the firm paid B an additional salary of $7,500. Assum-
ing that the $7,500 is invested at the same 5 per cent rate, the fund, because it pays no in-
come taxes, would accumulate at 5 per cent a year instead of at the 2.5 per cent rate. At
the end of 25 years, more than $375,000 will accumulate in B's retirement fund.
Upon retirement, B could withdraw the $375,000 in a lump sum or on an installment
basis. If he elects to withdraw the $375,000 in one payment, the portion of the amount paid
attributable to the corporation's contribution is taxed at ordinary income rates and the por-
tion of the lump sum due to appreciation is taxed at capital gain rates. Computed out, the
amount of income B would receive after taxes will be $234,000, that is almost double the
$130,000 that he would have under his personal retirement scheme. If B chooses to withdraw
the $375,000 on an installment basis, his net income is likely to be even greater than under
the lump sum method.
31 Pub. L. 87-792, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 76 Stat. 809 (1962). The Keogh Plan is an
attempt to give self-employed persons access to retirement plans on a reasonably similar basis
to that accorded corporate stockholders-employees. The basic Code sections involved in the
qualification and operation of the Keogh Plan are §§ 401-404 of the Code.
32 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 401-404.
33 Id. § 162, 402(a).
34 Id. § 501(a).
35 Id. § 404(e).
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15 per cent of his salary invested in a profit-sharing plan, " or up to 25 per cent
of his salary in a combined profit-sharing pension trust plan."7 There is also a
difference in the way the attorney-beneficiary is taxed upon receipt of the
proceeds of the fund. Under the Keogh Plan the proceeds, regardless of whether
received in one payment or in installments, are taxed at ordinary income rates. -
But in the Corporate Plan, if the money is withdrawn in one lump sum that
portion of the proceeds due to appreciation of the fund is treated as a capital
gain.
3 )
To demonstrate how these differences may affect the practicing attorney,
compare the results achieved in the following hypothetical. Lawyer A is married,
35 years of age, and a partner in a law firm having a Keogh Plan. His gross
annual income is $50,000 and after the maximum $2,500 Keogh investment, he
has a net income of $47,500. He requires approximately $32,035 for yearly
living expenses and he invests the remainder of his income. Attorney B is in a
similar economic position as A except that B's partnership recently incorporated
and inaugurated a corporate profit-sharing plan. As a result of this change, B
receives only $43,500 in net income but a $6,500 [15%] contribution to his profit-
sharing fund is made.
Result:
Partnership Form Corporate
$50,000 Gross Annual Income $50,000
2,500 Keogh Investment
Profit-Sharing Contribution 6,500
47,500 Net Income 43,500
5,000 Deductions 5,000
42,500 Taxable Income 38,500
13,340 Tax (without surcharge) 11,465
34,160 After-Tax Income 32,035
32,035 Living Expenses 32,035
2,125 Available for Personal Investment 0
After the first year, B has a $1,875 [$6,500 v. $4,625] total investment edge over
A. After thirty years, assuming that both A and B retire at 65 and receive their
retirement proceeds in one lump sum, the difference is more pronounced:
Individual Form Corporate
$ 4,625 Yearly Investment $ 6,500
109,698 30-Year Net Investment of Personal Savings at 6% .........
197,645 30-Year Net at 6% Under the Keogh Plan ------------
...........- 30-Year Net at 6% Under the Corporate Plan 513,878
307,343 Total Amount Distributed 513,878
54,826 Tax on Keogh Distribution ------------
------------ Tax on Corporate Distribution 134,139
252,517 Net Distribution 379,740
36 Id. § 404(a) (3) (A).
37 Id. § 404(a) (7).
38 Id. § 402(a) (1).
39 Id. §§ 402(a), 403(a).
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As shown in the table, after thirty years B's savings will exceed A's by $127,223.
Should the attorneys' incomes increase with age, the difference between the
Keogh and Corporate yields will be even greater.4"
There are other advantages which the Corporate Plan has over the Keogh
Plan. In the Keogh Plan no retirement benefits may be paid until the attorney
is at least 59.5 years old and not later than when he reaches the age of 70.5
years;41 whereas, under the Corporate Plan benefits may be paid upon retirement,
death, or disability.4" The Keogh rules are also more restrictive as to the manage-
ment of the monies in the plan. Keogh limits the investing of the funds to three
media: (1) bank trusts, (2) selected contracts from insurance companies, (3)
special United States retirement bonds.43 The Corporate Plan allows investment
in any reasonably secure investment." In addition, the attorney-beneficiaries may
act as trustees of a fund under a Corporate Plan, but not in the Keogh Plan."
Thus, only the former allows attorneys to avoid the cost of retaining an outside
trustee. Also, an incorporated law firm offering reasonable security, may borrow
from the corporate retirement fund ;46 neither a proprietorship nor a partnership
may borrow from a Keogh fund."
In order to qualify under the Keogh rules, a partnership must provide re-
tirement benefits for all full-time employees who have three years of service with
the firm.48 The Corporate plans permit greater discretion in excluding employees.
The Code provides that either 70 per cent of all employees must be covered,49 or
70 per cent of all employees must be eligible and 80 per cent of those eligible
covered.5" In computing these percentages, neither part-time employees nor
employees with less than five years' service need be counted.51 The significance of
this advantage is that low income employees, e.g., messengers and secretaries, may
be given the option of not participating in the plan.
There is also a difference in the manner in which the proceeds from the
deferred compensation plan will be treated if an employee dies before retirement.
40 With an increase in income, the attorney will have more money available for invest-
ment in the retirement plan.
41 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 401(d)(4)(B), 401(a)(9)(A).
42 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (i) (1970).
43 Rosen, Professional Corporations-Advantages and Disadvantages, 6 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 661, 670 (1971).
44 Note, Advantages and Disadvantages of Forming a Professional Association in Pennsyl-
vania, 43 TEMP. L. Q. 156 (1970).
45 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 401(d).
46 Id. § 503(f).
47 Id. § 503(g).
48 Id. § 401(d)(3).
49 Id. § 401(a)(3)(A).
50 Id.
51 Formerly, an issue existed as to whether the adoption of retirement plans would violate
the ABA's Canon of Ethics. To qualify the retirement plan, law firms normally must include
nonprofessional employees in the plan. But § 24 of the Canon of Ethics prohibits a lawyer
from dividing his fees with anyone except another lawyer. There had been some indication
that the ABA ethics committee would prohibit lawyers in a professional corporation from
having a profit-sharing plan which includes nonlawyers and beneficiaries, as would be re-
quired in order for the plan to qualify for favorable income tax treatment. The ABA has
modified its position. Disciplinary Rule 3-102 of the New ABA Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, which became effective in January of this year, specifically provides that "A lawyer
or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a retirement plan, even though the plan is
based in full or in part on a profit sharing arrangement."
[February, 1973]
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Under the Keogh rules the proceeds from the fund are included in the deceased
attorney's gross estate for tax purposes. 2 The Corporate Plan, however, allows
the proceeds from the fund to flow directly to the family free of any federal gift or
estate tax.53
Finally, Keogh plans require that all contributions to the fund vest im-
mediately in the employees;54 but the Corporate Plan allows vesting to be post-
poned for a reasonable waiting period and then vesting may proceed on an an-
nual basis, e.g., 10 per cent or 20 per cent a year. By suspending full vesting
of the employees' rights for a number of years, the law firm offers its employees
an additional incentive for remaining with the firm.
Automobile Expense Benefit. An incorporated law firm may give an at-
torney up to fifteen cents per mile as a tax-free reimbursement for the business
use of his own car,5" and the firm can deduct this payment as a business expense."
In contrast, a partner or self-employed attorney can deduct a maximum of ten
cents per mile for the first 15,000 miles and only seven cents thereafter as an
automobile business expense." By utilizing the maximum allowable corporate
reimbursement, an attorney who travels a great deal may gain some tax-free
income. For example, assume that Attorneys A and B each drove 80,000 miles
during the business year. A is practicing under a sole proprietorship; B also
practices alone but has incorporated. Both attorneys gross $100,000 and their
only business deduction is their automobile expenses. Personal deductions aside,
A will have a taxable income of $94,460, and an automobile expense deduction
of $5,640. B will have a taxable income of $88,000 and an automobile expense
deduction of $12,000. Since both A and B are in the 50% tax bracket, their
take-home earnings will be $52,870 ($47,230 and $5,640) and $56,000 ($44,000
and $12,000), respectively. By merely practicing under a corporate form, At-
torney B has gained $3,130 ($56,000 v. $52,870) in take-home income.
Health, Accident and Other Miscellaneous Benefits Only Available to Com-
mon Law Employees. The Code provides a number of tax benefits only to em-
ployees, 9 but nowhere in the Code is the term "employee" defined."0 In the
absence of any statutory definition, the courts and the Treasury6 have given the
term its common law meaning. 2 In short, any attorney working for a corporate
law firm is considered an employee, but only nonowners of a partnership or
proprietorship are considered employees.6 "
52 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2039(c).
53 Id. § 2039(c) (1).
54 Id. § 401(d) (2).
55 Id. §§ 401 (a) (7)-(8).
56 Rev. Rul. 63-13, 1963, 1 Cums. BULL. 69, modified, Rev. Rul. 65-212, 1965, 2 Cums.
BULL. 84.
57 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 162(a) (2).
58 Rev. Rul. 66-10, 1966, 1 Cuss. BULL. 622.
59 See text accompanying notes 64-76 infra.
60 Note, Professional Associations and Corporations: Tax Considerations, 11 Wm. & MARY
L. REv. 685, 692-93 (1970).
61 But see Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(b) (2) (1961) concerning employee stock options.
62 BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 399 (3rd ed. 1969) defines employee as "[olne who is
in such a relation to another person that the latter may control the work of the former and
direct the manner in which it shall be done."
63 Although § 401(c) of the Code extends the meaning of the term "employee" to include
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Because they are considered employees, corporate attorneys have a number
of advantages over partners or sole proprietors. Under the Code, an incorporated
law firm may provide each of its attorneys with up to $50,000 in life insurance
coverage without the premiums being included in the attorneys' gross income.
6 4
Moreover, amounts paid for these premiums are deductible by the law firm as
an ordinary and necessary business expense.65 The Code further provides that
if a corporate law firm distributes money to a beneficiary of an attorney by reason
of the latter's death, the beneficiary receives up to $5,000 free of income and
estate taxation.66 This death payment is also deductible by the law firm.6"
Tax-free medical expense plans are another important advantage only
available to corporate firms and their attorneys. The Code states that a corpora-
tion may provide tax-free medical expense insurance for one or more of its at-
torneys." These distributions are deductible by the law firm69 and not taxable to
the attorneys.70 Moreover, benefits paid to the attorneys to cover medical ex-
penses are generally excludable from the attorneys' gross income.7 In contrast,
partners or sole proprietors must provide their own medical insurance. 2 Further-
more, for income tax purposes partners or sole proprietors can deduct only that
portion of their medical bills which exceeds 3 per cent of adjusted-gross income
plus $150 for health insurance premiums. 3
Finally, in an unincorporated law firm, partners or sole proprietors are not
paid a salary, but rather, they are given a portion of the firm's net income.
Should a partner or sole proprietor become ill or injured, his firm may continue
to give him a portion of its net income, but any such payments are included in
the attorney's taxable income.74 However, under the corporate form, a firm may
pay any sick or disabled attorney up to $100 per week which is tax free to the
attorney75 and deductible by the law firm. 6
self-employed individuals and owner-employees, this section is only applicable to qualified
saving plans covered in §§ 401-404 of the Code.
64 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 79(a) (1). To a limited extent, coverage may include
dependents. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2) (ii) (b) (1970).
65 INT. RE V. CODE of 1954, § 162(a); Rev. Rul. 56-400, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 116. The
deduction to the corporation is disallowed, however, if the corporation is a beneficiary under
the life insurance policies. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 264(a) (1).
66 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(b).
67 Id. § 162(a).
68 Id. §§ 105, 106. See generally Pyle, Accident and Sickness Insurance Under Code
Sections 104, 105, 106 and 213, 34 TAxEs 363 '(1956); Harl, Selected Aspects of Employee
Status in Small Corporations, 13 KANs. L. REv. 23 (1964). Section 105 was added as a new
section in the 1954 Code for the purpose of providing uniform tax treatment to amounts
received under employer accident or health plans whether or not the funds are funded by in-
surance. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954).
69 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a).
70 Id. 106.
71 Id. 105(a)-(e).
72 Id. § 105(g).
73 Id. §§ 213(a)(1)-(2).
74 Id. §§ 105(g), 61(13).
75 Id. § 105(d). If payments received exceed 75 per cent of the employee's weekly wage
rate, there is a 30-day waiting period before the exclusion becomes effective. If the payments
received are 75 per cent or less of the employee's weekly wage rate, the waiting period is seven
days, and the exclusion is limited to $75 per week. The seven-day waiting period is eliminated
if the employee is hospitalized at least one day during the seven-day period; in addition, after
30 days the exclusion limit is raised from $75 to $100 per week. Id.
76 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(a).
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Favorable Corporate Tax Rates. For federal tax purposes, a corporation's
income is taxed at the rate of 22 per cent for the first $25,000 and at 48 per cent
on income in excess of that amount.7 Furthermore, the Code provides that 85
per cent of the dividends received by an incorporated law firm from its invest-
ments in other corporations are excludable from taxable income."8 Of course, a
second tax is imposed on all corporate income, but only when it is distributed to
its shareholders." Despite this "double taxation," in situations in which an at-
torney is in a high individual tax bracket, it is his advantage to incorporate his
firm and to structure his finances so that the corporation earns and retains up to
$25,000 in income per year. By so acting, the attorney is able to shelter the
retained amount in the corporation each year at the lower corporate tax rate of 22
per cent, thereby providing additional monies which may be invested in other
corporations.
A single example demonstrates the savings offered to an attorney who
utilizes the corporate tax rates. Assume that A is self-employed, earns $50,000
annually, hopes to retire in 30 years, and operates his practice as a sole
proprietorship. B is also practicing alone, earns $50,000 a year, hopes to retire
in 30 years, but he has recently incorporated his business. In 1972, both A's
and B's practices earn an additional $10,000 and both attorneys plan to invest
this extra income in stocks which return 6 per cent annually. A, having earned
this additional sum while in a 50 per cent tax bracket, will net approximately
$5,000 after federal taxes. Investing $5,000 at 6 per cent, A will gross $300 in
interest, but net only $150 after taxes. In contrast, B's corporation, assuming it
pays B a $50,000 salary, will have a gross income of $10,000. Having earned
$10,000 at a 22 per cent tax bracket, the corporation will net approximately
$7,800. Retaining this amount and investing it at 6 per cent, the corporate firm
will gross $464 in interest and net approximately $450.0
Sole
Proprietorship Corporation
$10,000 Additional Earnings $10,000
5,000 Tax (without surcharge) 2,200
5,000 Net Additional Income Available for Investment 7,800
300 Annual Return on an Investment Paying 6% 465
150 Annual Net Return on Investment 450
5,150 Total Net Income Derived from Earning 8,250
an Additional $10,000
77 Id. § 11(b). Code § 51 currently adds a 5 per cent surcharge.
78 Id. § 243.
79 Id. § 61(7).
80 See id. § 243.
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Assuming that A's and B's situations remain the same for the next 30 years, that
there is no accumulated earnings problem, and that upon B's retirement he will
withdraw all the corporation's retained earnings in one lump sum, the situation
will be as follows:
Sole Corporate
Proprietor Attorney
$ 5,150 Total Net Income Derived From Earning $ 8,250
An Additional $10,000
175,104 Total Net Income for Thirty Years Derived 621,717
from Earning an Additional $10,000 Per Year
and Investing It at 6%
Tax (capital gains treatment) 217,401
175,104 Net Savings 404,316
Nontax Advantages Derived from Incorporating. The most attractive
nontax advantage that an incorporated firm has over a partnership is "limited
liability." In all states, a partner in a law firm is fully liable for all tortious and
contractual liabilities resulting from his own conduct, and that of his partners,
associates, and other employees during the course of their employment.8" How-
ever, in the majority of states in which professional corporation acts have been
adopted an attorney is personnally liable only for his own wrongful acts and the
wrongful acts of those under his control.8 2 Thus, by operating as a corporation,
the practitioner may decrease the scope of his liability.
81 ALA. CODE fit. 43, § 5(15) (Supp. 1971); ALASKA STAT. § 32.05.100 (1962); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-215 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 65-115 (1966); CAL. CORPS. CODE
§ 15015 (1963); COLO. REV. STAT. § 104-1-15 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-53
(1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515 (1953); D.C. CODE § 41-314 (1963); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 75-308 (Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1061, § 15 (1952); IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-415
(1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 544.15 (Supp. 1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.220 (1971);
LA. REV. STAT. fit. 12, § 2872 (1952); MD. ANN. CODE art. 73, § 15 (1957); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. Ch. 108A, § 15 (1967); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450.227 (1968); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 323.14 (1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5554 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 358.150
(1966); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 63-207 (1970); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-315 (1971); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 87.150 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:1-15 (1940); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-15
(Supp. 1972); N.Y. CONS. LAW ANN. BOOK 38, art. 3, § 26 (1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
59-45 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.14 (1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, § 215
(1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 37 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-12-26 (1970); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 52-27 (1962); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 48-2-10 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §
61-114 (1955); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. §
48-1-12 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. fit. 11, § 1207 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15 (1972);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.04.150 (1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-8A-15 (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 123.12 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-209 (1957). Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kansas, Maine and New Hampshire find liability under the common law.
82 The following statutes appearing in roman type limit attorneys' liability while those
preceded by an asterisk do not. ALA. CODE fit. 46, § 335 (Supp. 1971); *ALASKA STAT. §
10.45.150 (1968); *ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-905 (Supp. 1972); *ARK. STAT. ANN. §
64-2015 (Supp. 1971); CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6160-72 (West Supp. 1971); *CoLo.
REV. STAT. ch. 23, rule 265 (1963); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 34-82(1) (1969); *DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 608 (Supp. 1970); D.C. PuB. L. No. 92-180, (Dec. 10, 1971) *(D.C. Code
Legislative & Administrative Service Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 621.07 (Supp. 1972);
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Another attractive feature of corporations is the characteristic of "continuity
of existence." In a partnership the admission or withdrawal of a partner tech-
nically terminates the partnership. In most cases, the firm will own tangible
assets and accounts receivable necessitating costly accounting expenses and dif-
ficult appraisal problems in dividing the assets and in evaluating the liabilities of
the firm on such termination. 3 In a corporation, however, the life of the firm
does not terminate with the admission or withdrawal of an attorney. 4 In ad-
dition, since each attorney's equity in the firm is in the form of shares of stock
and since each normally will have a prearranged buy-sell agreement with the
corporation, the above-mentioned accounting and evaluation problems are
avoided.
IV. Disadvantages of Incorporation
Double Taxation. A partnership is a nontaxable business entity."5 For
purposes of federal taxation any partnership profits or losses are allocated to the
partner-attorneys who must include them in their individual returns.8 6 Such
profits and losses are taxed to the partners at ordinary income rates. On the
other hand, the corporation is a taxable entity and must pay federal taxes on its
net income. " Again, when a corporation's income is distributed as dividends to
the shareholders it is taxable to them as personal income. 0 The undesirable
effect this second tax can have on an attorney's spendable income is illustrated
in the accompanying table. Assuming that the corporation is entirely owned by
one attorney and that its net after tax income is distributed to him in full, the
following table compares the income of a sole proprietor and a sole shareholder
of a corporation at different levels.5 0
GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4307 (1967); *HWwAn REv. LAWS § 416-153 (Supp. 1971); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 30-1306 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 415-8 (1970); IND. ANN. STAT. §
25-5109 (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 496C.9 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
17-2715 (Supp. 1971); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 274.055 (1969); LA. REv. STAT. tit. 12, §
807 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 708 '(Supp. 1972); M. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 435
(Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156A, § 10 (Supp. 1971); MICH. ComP. LAWS
ANN. § 450.227 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 319.34 (1969); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5390-47
(Supp. 1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 356.016 (1966); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2107
(1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2210 (1970); NEV. REV. STAT. § 89.060 (1968); N.H. REv.
STAT. § 294-A:3 (1971), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:17-8 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
51-22-8 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. STAT. ANN. § 1505 (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5511-9
(Supp. 1971); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1785.04 (Supp. 1971); Oregon Professional Corpora-
tion Act, ch. 592, [1969] OREGON LAWS 1222; PA:. STAT. ANN. TIT. 15, § 2913 (Supp. 1972);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-5.1-1 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1607 (Supp. 1970); S.D. ComP.
LAWS ANN. § 47-13A-7 (Supp. 1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2007 (Supp. 1972); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528e, § 16 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-11-10 (Supp. 1972);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 908 '(Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.-547 (Supp. 1971); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 18.100.070 (Supp. 1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-2-5a (Supp. 1972);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.99(8) (Supp. 1972); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-49:1 (Supp. 1971).
83 Rosen, Professional Corporations-Advantages and Disadvantages, 6 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 661, 665-66 (1970).
84 Note, Professional Associations and Corporations: Tax Considerations, 11 Wm. & MARY
L. REv. 685, 703 (1970).
85 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 701.
86 Id. § 702.
87 Id.
88 Id. § 11.
89 Id. § 61(a).
90 B. Bittker & J. Eustice, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ON CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-






0. P. . 0
$ 25,000 $ 6,000 $ 19,000 $ 5,500 $19,500 $ 4,250 $ 15,250
50,000 17,000 33,000 17,500 32,500 8,875 23,625
100,000 45,200 54,800 41,500 58,500 21,500 37,000
250,000 146,000 104,000 113,500 136,500 68,000 68,500
500,000 321,000 179,000 233,500 266,500 157,500 109,000
1,000,000 471,000 329,000 473,500 526,500 339,500 187,000
*Income less individual tax liability.
**Income less corporate tax liability.
***Ignoring the $100 dividend exclusion of § 116.9'
Liquidating the Interest of a Retiring Partner. One of the most significant
disadvantages of incorporation is the additional taxes incurred when disposing of
an attorney-shareholder's interest in the firm. The Code provides a tax option to
a retiring partner and his partnership as to how the disposal of his interest in the
firm will be treated.2 First, the parties may elect to handle the partnership's
acquisition of the retiring partner's interest as a purchase of goodwill provided
that the appropriate provisions are made therefore in the partnership agreement.
In this case the Code does not allow the remaining partners to deduct this pay-
ment as a business expense,9" but it does allow the retiring attorney to consider
the distribution as a capital gain. Second, the parties may treat this distribution
to the retiring attorney as a payment with respect to future income.' If the
parties decide on this alternative, the payment reduces the taxable income of the
remaining partners, but it is ordinary income to the retiring partner.9" On the
other hand, in redeeming an attorney's interest in an incorporated firm, any pay-
ment to the attorney-shareholder is taxed as a capital gain, but the outflow of
money is not deductible by the firm. The advantageous options available to
partners are simply not open to attorneys of a corporate law firm. This disad-
vantage can be clearly seen in the following example. Assume that both at-
torneys A and B are retiring from their law firms. Also assume that both at-
torneys work for similar law firms except that A's law firm is a five-man partner-
ship and B's law firm is a corporation with five shareholders. The income for
1972 is $250,000 for both the partnership and the corporation. The partnership
91 However, by taking out large but reasonable attorney salaries, making maximum con-
tributions to its Corporate Plan, and fully deducting expenses a corporate law firm can avoid
or minimize the additional taxes resulting from incorporation.
92 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 736.
93 Id. § 736(b).
94 Id.
95 Id. § 736(a).
96 Id. § 702.
97 Id. § 302.
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decides to give A $50,000 as payment for his interest in the firm. The corporation
gives B $50,000 as a redemption payment for all of his stock. Under § 736 (a) of
the Code the partnership and A could treat the $50,000 as a purchase of goodwill
or as a payment in respect to future income of the firm. If the partnership makes
the goodwill purchase, A may treat the $50,000 as a capital gain and the remain-
ing four partners will be taxed proportionately on the full $250,000 income.
However, if the partnership and A choose the latter course, A will report the
$50,000 as ordinary income and the remaining four partners will be taxed on
$200,000. B, however, must treat the $50,000 as a capital gain and the cor-
poration is not allowed to deduct it as an expense. Thus, assuming that the four
remaining attorneys each take $50,000 in salaries, the corporation's earnings for
1972 will be $50,000 (which presumably will also be distributed as dividends










Retiring Attorney's 25,000* 50,000 25,000*
Taxable Income ('/2 x 50,000) (/2 x 50,000)
Amount of Tax Paid
by Retiring Lawyer 7,190 17,060 7,190
Amount of Tax Paid by






Taxable Income 275,000 250,000 275,000
Total Tax Paid 101,690 85,300 112,970
*In computing an individual's tax liability on a long-term capital gain, one half of the
gain is added to his ordinary income and is then taxed as ordinary income.
**The corporate tax rate of 48 per cent.
98 The difference will be even greater if the corporate law firm is deemed to be a col-
lapsible corporation. See INT. RIv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 341(b) (1), '(b) (3), (b) (4) (B). Gain
from the sale, exchange or redemption of an interest in a collapsible corporation is taxed as
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State Property and Capital Stock Taxes. Unlike a partnership, in many
states corporations are subject to state property and capital stock taxes. For
example, Pennsylvania imposes a property tax of 12 per cent on corporate net
earnings and capital stock tax of 7 mills per dollar on the actual value of the
equity in the corporation.' Thus, in that state, an incorporated law firm with
net assets valued at $100,000 and average earnings of $15,000 per year must
pay a combined property and capital stock tax of $2,500. This is a substantial
expense which a partnership avoids. However, writers in the area do not feel
that state taxes are significant: 1 00
For most professional associations, the bulk of the earnings will be exhausted
through salaries, leaving little as net taxable earnings. The corporate tax
is applied only to the latter, since the former is deductible .... Furthermore,
the Capital Stock Tax . . . should not be a significant consideration, since
the capitalization of most associations will be small. The professional as-
sociation does not require a large capitalization because there is little need
for expensive buildings or equipment.
10'
V. Possible Tax Problems Derived from Incorporation
Bunching of Income. Section 706 (a) of the Code provides that each partner
must include on his individual tax return any income earned by the partnership
during its tax year ending within his own tax year.' Section 706(b) provides
that a partnership may not change its tax year to one different from that used
by its members.' However, prior to 1954 many firms adopted a fiscal tax year,
while their partners utilized a calendar year." 4 By so doing, partners were thus
able to defer taxation of a portion of their incomes. For example, assume a part-
nership has a fiscal year ending March 31 and that its partners are on a calendar
year. On December 31, 1972, the partner must include in income all monies
earned by the partnership through March 31, 1972. Income earned by the part-
nership after that date will not be included in the partner's income until the end
of the succeeding tax year, December 31, 1973. In other words, each partner
delays including in his gross income until December 31, 1973, the income of the
partnership earned from April 1 through December 31, 1972. As long as the
partnership continues, this annual lag will exist. However, if the partnership is
ordinary income rather than as a capital gain. Id. § 341 (a). An incorporated law firm is open
to attack as a collapsible corporation because normally its main assets are "unrealized receiv-
ables or fees." Although there are no cases in which the Service has attempted to give such
exchanges § 341 treatment, the Service has hinted that it might do so in the future. See
Thies, An Estate Planner's Approach to the Professional Corporation, 109 TRusTs & ESTATES
83, 290 (1970). If the Service does take this position and is successful, the retiring share-
holder-employee in our example would be taxed $17,060 rather than $7,190, and the other
shareholders and the corporation will continue to pay the same amount of taxes.
99 Note, Advantages and Disadvantages of Forming a Professional Association in Penn-
sylvania, 43 TEmP. L.Q. 152, 162 (1970).
100 Cf. J. Vassen, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS § 2.36 (1970).
101 Note, Advantages and Disadvantages of Forming a Professional Association in Pennsyl-
vania, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 152, 162 (1970).
102 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 706(a).
103 Id. § 706(b).
104 Section 706(b) restricts the change to a different tax year, but does not require
partnerships that are already on a fiscal year to adjust.
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dissolved and a corporate law firm is initiated, a partner must include in income
for the year the partnership is dissolved all earned income of the partnership
not previously reported on the partner's tax returns."°5 In other words, if the
partnership were to dissolve and become an incorporated law firm on May 1,
1972, each former partner, now employee, would, on December 31, 1972, include
in his gross income his portion of partnership income from April 1, 1971, through
April 30, 1972, plus all salaries paid to him by the corporation from May 1 until
December 31, 1972."6 Taxed at peak earning year rates, this results in a con-
siderable burden, and not all partners have sufficient liquid assets to cover such
a tax. For this reason many tax experts have doubts about the practicalities of
incorporating a firm that has previously elected a fiscal year."
Unreasonable Compensation. In order to generate sufficient monies for
their retirement plans, and in an effort to prevent double taxation of corporate
earnings, attorneys may attempt to set their salaries at such a level as to absorb
most of the firm's earnings. However, § 162 (a) of the Code provides that a
corporation is only entitled to deduct "a reasonable allowance for salaries or
other compensation for personal services actually rendered."'0 8 If no services
are rendered, or if the services are rendered but the compensation paid is exces-
sive, such payment is not deductible by the firm as a business expense, and the
purported salary is treated as a constructive dividend to the shareholder-attor-
ney.' 9 It is therefore imperative that incorporating attorneys structure their
practice so that their salaries are reasonable compensation for services actually
rendered.
Since corporate law firms are relatively new, there are very few precedents
which will guide a firm in its efforts to set high but reasonable salaries for its
shareholders-attorneys. Although the Code is silent on this matter, most writers
in this field anticipate that if a lawyer earned $70,000 annually from his former
practice, he may safely withdraw the same amount from the corporation in the
form of a yearly salary."' However, a strong minority of tax experts have severely
criticized this position. 1' One writer succinctly expressed the minority view as
follows:
It is seductive, but possibly simplistic, to conclude that just because a former
partner who is now an employee-shareholder had in a comparable prior
year a $100,000 partnership share of earnings, that he can safely be paid a
"salary" of $100,000 by his new corporation. One might say: "Well, he
can go elsewhere and earn $100,000; accordingly, the corporation in an
adversary economic situation would have to pay him $100,000 to hold him."
What is ignored is that in the partnership situation his $100,000 was not
105 See INT. REV. ConE of 1954, §§ 701, 702.
106 Example adapted from Note, Advantages and Disadvantages of Forming a Professional
Asociation in Pennsylvania, 43 TEmp. L.Q. 152, 162 '(1970).
107 See, e.g., Thies, An Estate Planner's Approach to the Professional Corporation, 109
TRUSTS & ESTATEs 83, 256 (1970).
108 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 162(a).
109 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1970).
110 See, e.g., J. Vassen, supra note 100, at § 2.33. Bat see Rosen, Professional Corporations-
Advantages and Disadvantages, 6 LAND & WATER L. Rzv. 661, 685 (1970).
111 See Alexander, Some Tax Problems of a Professional Association, 13 W. REs. L. REv.
212, 215-18 (1962); Thies, supra note 107, at 256.
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alone recompense for his personal services. It included a return on his in-
vestment in the partnership. To attempt to justify a $100,000 salary today
because of a $100,000 partnership share last year is to compare lemons with
grapefruits.21 2
Once a corporate law firm has decided upon a reasonable salary, it must
still satisfy the second requirement, i.e., the compensation must represent pay-
ment for actual services rendered, rather than a distribution of corporate earn-
ings and profits.1 ' For the typical attorney this will not be a problem since all
of his income can generally be attributed to services personally rendered. How-
ever, in the larger firms, where senior partners often devote a great deal of time
to public projects but still receive full salary-a salary that far exceeds their
financial contribution to the firm as measured by billable hours--this second
requirement may prove to be very vexatious."' In such circumstances, the Ser-
vice may rule that the attorney's compensation was not a salary for services ac-
tually rendered but a dividend distributed from the firm's profits. As a practical
matter, the corporation must analyze the contributions made by senior partners,
including goodwill, business brought in and administrative duties, and adjust
their salaries accordingly.
Accumulated Earnings Tax. As previously discussed, it is to the advantage
of any attorney in a high individual tax bracket to incorporate his law firm and
to structure his practice so that the corporation earns and retains up to $25,000
in income per year." 5 However, should an attorney elect to do so, he must exer-
cise care in order to avoid the special penalty taxes contained in §§ 531-537
of the Code." 6 These sections impose a tax of 27%-38% per cent on any accu-
mulated earnings of a corporation in excess of $100,000, unless such additional
earnings are retained for the purpose of meeting the reasonable business needs
of the firm."' Although the Code does not spell out what constitutes "reasonable
business needs," the Treasury Department has issued specific guidelines to assist
attorneys in making this determination." 8 Treasury Regulation § 1.5732-2 (b)" 9
indicates that firms may accumulate corporate earnings and profits in order to
finance the purchase of equipment,"2° to acquire additional office space,"' to
112 Thies, supra note 107, at 256.
113 INT. RPv. CODE of 1954, § 162(a).
114 See Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1958),
aff'g 29 T.C. 339 (1957). In Klamath a group of Oregon physicians organized a private
corporation that provided medical services and hospital facilities to the public. The physicians,
although only supplying the medical services, structured their salaries on the basis of the entire
corporate income, including income generated from the hospital facilities. The total amount
paid to them exceeded their personal billings for medical services. The court held that the
compensation received by the physicians was reasonable only up to 100 per cent of their billings
and disallowed corporate deductions for compensation above that amount, finding such deduc-
tions to be a distribution of corporate profits.
115 See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
116 INT. Ray. CODE of 1954, §§ 531-37.
117 Id. § 532(a). The tax is imposed at the rate of 27V per cent for the first $100,000 of
accumulated earnings and at the rate of 38/ per cent on any excess over that amount. Id. §
531. In computing the tax, however, corporations receive a $100,000 credit before incurring
the penalty tax. Id. § 535(c).
118 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.537-2(b)(1)-(5) (1970).
119 Id. § 1.537-2(b). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.537 (a) (1970).




expand its working capital, 2 or to pay off its indebtedness . 2  Furthermore,
judicial decisions suggest that other purposes may justify the retention of cor-
porate earnings, e.g., the need to fund pension and profit-sharing plans for em-
ployees,'24 the obligation of providing for the redemption of deceased or dis-
qualified shareholders' stock, 2 and the necessity of protecting against various
business risks and contingencies such as self-insurance against casualties and
malpractice suits.'26
In light of the guidelines discussed above, a corporate law firm should be
able to justify a substantial retention of earnings." ' However, if excess earnings
begin to accumulate beyond reasonable limits, the funds should be utilized for
increased contributions to the employees' retirement fund or distributed as divi-
dends to the attorneys-shareholders.
Personal Holding Company Tax. In addition to the regular corporate in-
come tax, an incorporated law firm is susceptible to being taxed as a personal
holding company. 2 Under § 541 of the Code a special penalty tax, at the rate
of 70 per cent, is imposed on the "undistributed personal holding company in-
come" of any personal holding company.'29 For definitional purposes, a per-
sonal holding company is any incorporated law firm in which more than 50
per cent of its outstanding stock is owned directly or indirectly by not more than
five attorneys and in which at least 60 per cent of the firm's adjusted ordinary
gross income for the taxable year is "personal holding company income.""'
In the context of an incorporated law firm, personal holding company income
refers to the fees generated by an attorney-shareholder who has at least 25 per
cent interest in the firm and who has performed services under a contract wherein
a person other than the law firm had the right to designate the attorney who was
to perform the services.'
Four elements must be present before the personal holding company tax
will be imposed on a firm's retained earnings.
(1) at least 60 per cent of the firm's adjusted gross ordinary income is
derived from personal services."2
As can readily be seen, an incorporated law firm renders legal services from which
122 Id. § 1.537-2(b) (4) (1970).
123 Id. § 1.537-2(b) (3) (1970).
124 See Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965).
125 See Oman Constr. Co., 24 T.C. Mem. 1799 (1965). In this case the Tax Court held
that the need to purchase the stock of a dissenting minority stockholder is a reasonable reason
to accumulate earnings.
126 B. Bittker & J. Eustice, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 1 8.03 (3d ed. 1971).
127 Note, Professional Corporations: Analysis under the Tax Reform Act and Survey of
State Statutes, 58 GRo. L.J. 487, 501 (1970); See B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 126 at ff
8.03. Contra, Note, Incorporating the Professional Practice: Federal Tax Aspects, 38 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 449, 468 (1971).
128 See generally Friedman, Liquidation of Corporations Becoming Domestic Personal Hold-
ing Companies Under the Revenue Act of 1964, 20 TAX L. Ruv. 435 (1965).
129 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 541.
130 Id. §§ 541(a)(1)-(2).
131 Id. §§ 543(a) (1) (A)-(B).
132 Id. § 542(a) (1).
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substantially all of its income is derived. Such services are personal services and
therefore all firms would possess this first element.
(2) more than 50 per cent of the corporation's stock is owned, directly
or indirectly by not more than five attorneys."'
This second element will automatically be found in any incorporated firm with
less than ten attorneys-shareholders, and may exist in an incorporated firm with
ten or more attorneys-shareholders unless each attorney holds approximately the
same interest in the corporation.
(3) the fees were earned by an attorney-shareholder who had a 25 per
cent or more interest in the outstanding stock of the corporation.""
The third element will normally exist only in small firms, thus allowing the larger
firms to avoid the personal holding company tax. For example, a five-man firm
in which each attorney holds a 20 per cent interest in outstanding capital stock
could not satisfy this requirement.
(4) in the contract between the client and the firm, someone (client)
other than the corporation must have the right to designate which at-
torney is to perform the services. 3 ,
The Internal Revenue Service will presume that this fourth element exists, unless
the contract states that the corporation retains the right to designate the attorney
who shall handle the matter. 36
If a law firm is found to be a personal holding company, the penalty tax
can be avoided in two ways. First, the firm could distribute all of its income in
the form of salaries, but this may lead to unreasonable compensation problems. '"
Second, the firm could distribute its personal holding company income to its
shareholders in the form of dividends.
Exchange of Partnership Assets for Stock. 3 ' Theoretically, the transfor-
mation of a partnership into a corporation is a three-step process. First, the part-
nership is dissolved. Second, the firm's property, i.e., accounts receivable, accounts
payable, furniture, fixtures, office space, equipment, and other partnership prop-
erty, is distributed pro rata to its former owners. Third, each attorney transfers
his share of the distributed property to the corporation in exchange for stock and
other securities. Under § 351 of the Code, partners do not recognize any gain
or loss on the transfer of such property, provided they collectively own at least 80
per cent of the corporate stock immediately after the transfer.'39 Similarly, the
133 Id. § 542(a) (2).
134 Id. § 543(a) (7) (A).
135 Id. § 543(a)'(7) (B).
136 See Rev. Rul. 69-299, 1969-1 CuM. BUL. 165.
137 See text accompanying notes 108-14 supra.
138 See generally Note, Incorporating the Professional Practice: Federal Tax Aspects, 38
BROOKLYN L. REV. 449, 453-61 (1971); Greenberg, Special Problems of the Professional
Association, 12TH TUL. TAx INsT. 82, 83-87 (1971).
139 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351(a).
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corporation does not recognize any gain or loss upon receipt of the property,
but merely assumes the transferor's basis in the property.' However, despite the
fact that § 351 transfers are immune from capital gain or loss treatment, there
are several adverse tax consequences which may result from incorporation.
Generally, the principal asset of any firm is its accounts receivable and it
normally operates on a cash-basis method of accounting. A law partnership,
therefore, does not record accounts receivable as earned income until payment
is actually received. Because a firm usually does not receive any payment from
its clients until the requested service is completed, it constantly has a substantial
number of accounts outstanding for which taxable income has not yet been recog-
nized.
In the past the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that a
cash-basis taxpayer cannot utilize § 351 in order to avoid the taxation of in-
come, i.e., the taxes on accounts receivable and work in progress."' Thus, if
the partnership's receivables are conveyed to the new corporation, the Service
may deem this transfer as "an assignment of income" and argue that it is not
protected by § 351."' If the Service is successful, both the former partners and
the corporation must report the value of the accounts receivable as income,
thereby subjecting the earnings to double taxation.
Most writers in this area maintain that there is little risk of the courts up-
holding the Service's stand." 3
Although it was once a burning issue, most students of this area have con-
cluded that there is little or no risk in transferring receivables to newly
formed corporations in a Section 351 transaction. The "assignment of in-
come" bugaboo is simply not in point. Plainly there is an "assignment of
income"-a sale or exchange of income items for stock . . . it is simply
that Congress has said in Section 351 that the realized gain shall not be
recognized if the requirements of that section are met.'
44
Furthermore, there are a number of judicial decisions which have rejected the
Service's position and have permitted transferors to convey receivables to a cor-
poration without declaring them as personal income.
4
Analogous to the problem of outstanding accounts receivable is the problem
of outstanding accounts payable. Normally a law firm which operates on a cash
basis will have some unpaid liabilities for which the firm has not taken any tax
deduction. In the past the Internal Revenue Service has argued that the new
corporation must capitalize the accounts payable and cannot deduct them as
a business expense. 4 In effect, the Service's position causes the former partners
140 Id. § 368(c).
141 Id. § 362(a).
142 Thies, An Estate Planner's Approach to the Professional Corporation, 109 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 83, 255 (1970); Greenberg, supra note 138, at 85; Note, supra note 138, at 457.
143 See, e.g., Rosen, Professional Corporations-Advantages and Disadvantages, 6 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 661, 680; Thies, supra note 138; Note, supra note 138; Greenberg, supra note
138.
144 Thies, supra note 142.
145 Thomas W. Briggs, 15 T.C. Mem. 440 (1956); Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.O. 533 (1962).
146 Greenberg, supra note 138, at 86.
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and the new corporation to lose this deduction. However, the majority of writers
feel that the IRS's argument is weak and contrary to § 351." In addition, it
has been suggested that the Service will no longer challenge the transfer of ac-
counts payable.'48
But incorporators must be aware of a third possibility of adverse tax con-
sequences arising out of the transfer of partnership property. This problem
arises out of the fact that there is an exception to § 351 contained in § 357(c).
This section provides that a transferor of property does recognize gain to the
extent that any liabilities assumed by the corporation exceed the transferor's basis
in the property transferred.' Since the firm's accounts receivable will have a
zero basis, the accounts will not offset the transferred accounts payable in re-
gard to § 357(c). Therefore, unless the firm has other assets whose cumula-
tive bases equal or exceed the amount of liabilities assumed by the corporation,
the transferors may recognize some gain on the transfer of property to the cor-
poration.
VI. Conclusion
As stated in the introduction, the goal of this article was not to advocate
or to denounce the incorporation of law firms, but rather to sketch the many ele-
ments that must be considered before an attorney could make an informed deci-
sion on his own behalf. In making this decision, attorneys must meticulously
analyze the previously discussed benefits, detriments and problems of incorpora-
tion, and assiduously apply them to their particular situations. In addition, at-
torneys must take into consideration the possibility that Congress may curtail the
disparate treatment between professional corporations and partnerships, thereby
reducing the time and money spent on incorporation to a meaningless expense.
Finally, attorneys must scrupulously study their state statutes in order to avoid
any unexpected pitfalls which might affect their firm's and their own tax status.
Michael J. McGoldrick
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